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The Potential for Ethics Without God Through Bertrand Russell’s Authentic
Notion of Philosophical Inquiry
J. M. Magrini
College of Dupage

Violence dominates the landscape of our present world. Prejudice and sectarianism threaten
human rights, putting our hopes for the authentic possibility of humane ethical/moral interaction
on a global scale in serious question. Ours is a world where epistemological and ethical
relativism appear to rule the day. In these extremely hard times, it would benefit us, as
philosophers, informed thinkers, and concerned human beings, to revisit with a discerning eye
and charitable heart the philosophy of Bertrand Russell, which reminds us in a powerfully
persuasive manner just how important philosophy can be in offering hope for a better world
during dark, turbulent times. In what follows, I examine the unique way in which Russell
responds to the following question: What is philosophy good for, what is the value of philosophy
for the world and its inhabitants? His response to these queries resonates with a distinctive
ethical tone and timbre.
It was Russell (1985) who began seriously thinking about the legitimate possibility of
humanist ethics without God when writing Why I am Not a Christian, wherein he claimed that
religion was a pariah on the human condition, the cause of unthinkable and immeasurable
suffering. “I regard [religion] as a disease,” he wrote, “born out of fear and as a source of untold
misery to the human race” (p. 125). Russell also believed that religion was inconsequential to our
understanding and practice of morality. Despite living in a world devoid of intrinsic value, a
world in which no divinely sanctioned, objective and absolute moral principles existed, it was
our duty to search out “human” values and meanings, and it was possible, according to Russell,
because of our capability to think rationally and our capacity to be deeply moved on an
emotional level, to understand the world in distinctly moral terms:
Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolution of her secular hurryings through the
abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child, still subject to her power, but gifted
with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of
his unthinking Mother (p. 152).
In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell wrote in a highly speculative and refreshingly
poetic manner about that which is crucial to the understanding of what good philosophy is all
about, namely, the indispensable concern for the ethical when approaching the ultimate questions
of existence. According to Russell, if practiced as an ethical discipline, philosophy can guide our
enquiry along the path to knowledge of the world, and more importantly, philosophy can also
inspire us to actively improve the world that we inhabit with others. Russell identifies
philosophy’s value in its potential to authentically inspire our practical ethical comportment,
fostering and enhancing our legitimate interpersonal relationships, as a secondary benefit of a

unique method of enquiry. Russell believes that philosophical enquiry is best practiced as an
ethical endeavor when it retains and accentuates the crucial distinction between what Russell
terms the “Self” (the philosopher) and the “not-Self” (the objects of the philosopher’s
contemplation), stressing a charitable and respectful attitude toward questioning the world at
large and its inhabitants.
Russell (1969) opposes the traditional and dogmatic subject-centered model of
philosophical enquiry that, “fetters contemplation to the self” and finds its ground in the
absolutist tendency to reduce the objects of its enquiry to a comprehensive and categorical body
of systematic knowledge in which the notion of difference, or otherness, is either pared down or
abolished (p 159). According to Russell, what traditional philosophy calls knowledge, “is not a
union with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, and designs making an impenetrable veil
between us and the world beyond” (p 159). Russell’s distrust of rigid, systematic philosophical
explanation emerges from his critique of all forms of philosophy that display the heedless drive
to understand the world in unabashedly categorical terms. He is also critical of philosophies
which attempt to force the vast and expansive universe to conform with our preconceived
epistemological notions of how things should be, presumptuously embracing the idea of Man as
the “measure of all things” while callously neglecting the all-important ethical distinction
between the Self and the not-Self (p 159).
In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell effectively attacks the epistemological relativism
of Protagoras, Nietzsche’s idea of truth as a human construct, the idealism of Bishop Berkeley,
and Kant’s monumental attempt in The Critique of Pure Reason to reconcile rationalism with
the tenets of empiricism. Russell’s brilliant critique of the Western philosophical tradition
renders the aforementioned positions unsound and illogical. For in essence, as related to
Russell’s understanding of ethical philosophical enquiry, they fail to adopt a charitable and
respectful attitude toward the not-Self. “There is a widespread [negative] philosophical
tendency,” writes Russell,
towards the view that Man is the measure of all things, that truth is manmade, that space
and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind, and if there be anything
not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us (p 159).
Philosophers fall into error, according to Russell, for two reasons. First, they make the
assumption that humans are seamlessly woven into the complex fabric of the world, and
secondly, they believe that it is possible to “assimilate the universe to Man,” and not vice versa
(p 159). Importantly, when we incorrectly perceive and judge that the world is just like us, that
is, that the world is identical to the “Self,” we mistakenly imagine that “knowledge of it is
possible without admission of what seems alien” (p 158). Russell, quite correctly, is highly
critical of the pervasive attitude within much of philosophy’s tradition that believes that all
knowledge of the world presupposes a reduction and assimilation of the object to the thinking
subject into a closed, all-encompassing, system of explanation, or grand-narrative.
Russell eloquently describes the philosopher’s (Self) authentic relationship with the
objects of philosophical contemplation (not-Self) in terms of a union that must be liberated from

any and all self-centered aims on the part of the thinker. “Knowledge,” as Russell states, “is a
from of union of Self and not-Self; and like all union, it is impaired by dominion and therefore
by any attempt to force the universe into conformity with what we find in ourselves” (p 159).
According to Russell, the philosopher must, with steadfast resolve, abstain from the headstrong
disposition that would violently force the objects of philosophical contemplation to conform
with preconceived notions of how they should be, for philosophical knowledge can never be
subjugated or controlled by the thinking subject. Knowledge of a philosophical nature is never a
possession of the thinker because it always transcends the possibility of reducing the world to
our ways of perceiving and thinking.
Russell states that philosophical contemplation, in the form of the union of Self and notSelf, should never “aim at proving that the rest of the universe is akin to man” (p 158). Rather, in
Russell’s opinion, it is philosophy that must adapt to “the characters which it finds in its objects,”
and if the philosopher grants to the objects of his contemplation the just due of their uniqueness
and “otherness,” he expresses an attitude that embraces and actively works to preserve the
sublime sense of wonder inherent to our world and the infinite universe (p 16). Russell demands
that all philosophical investigation should adopt an ethical approach to its questioning, which is
highlighted and characterized by the desire to allow the not-Self, that which is radically Other
and always beyond our absolute comprehension, to retain its question-worthy status, its unique,
foreign, and mysterious nature with respect to our ways of being.
In response to the possibility of allowing the objects of our philosophical thoughts to
retain their uniqueness, or transcendent natures, as we attempt to understand them, Russell
proposes an ethical model for philosophical enquiry wherein “true” contemplation, “finds its
satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects
contemplated” (p 160). As opposed to interpreting the universe as a means to the philosopher’s
ends, in a relationship that privileges the Self above the universe (not-Self), Russell reverses the
variables in the equation by proposing an authentic model for philosophical enquiry, as
contemplation, wherein the universe, or not-Self, is given priority. Russell urges the philosopher
to grant a sense of superiority to the objects of philosophy, and “through the infinity of the
universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity” (p 159). Russell
understands knowledge as the product of the asymmetrical union between the Self and not-Self,
wherein the philosopher embraces the recalcitrant universe, and through a loving, intractable,
and ever-evolving discourse, works to reveal the hidden nature of the universe. The universe, in
turn, remains forever beyond the philosopher’s logical grasp, despite the philosopher’s best
attempts at explanation.
For unlike the sciences, the problems, issues, and questions to which we can provide no
definitive solutions and responses, “remain to form the residue which is called philosophy” (p
155). If it should ever be the case that philosophy provides a categorical explanation for the
things it interrogates, they leave the purview of philosophy and become something other than a
subject for philosophy. The philosopher must recognize that definitive knowledge of the world,
specifically in terms of philosophical knowledge, is a hopelessly impossible ideal.
True contemplation, according to Russell, finds satisfaction and its value in all that
enlarges and ameliorates the not-Self, or the objects of philosophical reflection. Philosophical

contemplation conceived as an ethical endeavor is the liberating freedom from narrow
subjective, egoistic aims and expresses an impartial attitude through “the unalloyed desire for
truth,” which should always be free from prejudice and dogmatism in all matters of truth-seeking
(p 160). It is Russell’s claim that the freedom and impartiality of the philosopher’s charitable
and respectful attitude afforded to the objects of thought carries over into the philosopher’s
interpersonal relationships, preserving a similar freedom and impartiality in the realm of
practical activity, which includes the understanding of the human as a fragile, passionate, and
emotional being. Russell is careful to elucidate and punctuate the notions of authentic social
justice and universal love that emerge from philosophy’s unique method of ethical reflection.
According to Russell, retaining the openness of both mind and soul in the unprejudiced quest for
philosophical truth is, “the very same quality of mind which, in action is justice, and in emotion
as the universal love which can be given to all, and not only those who are judged useful or
admirable” (p 161). Just as the great philosopher resists the complete “objectification” of his
subject-matter, so too the good, moral human avoids the “objectification” of other human beings.
With such understanding, perhaps we can acquire a newfound respect for the differences within
others, allowing those people with whom we share the world to retain their uniqueness. Thus, as
opposed to privileging our own personal desires, treating others as disposable means-to-the-ends
of our projects, the possibility exists for a renewed sense of dignity to rise up from the heart of
the human condition.
This protracted relationship between Self and not-Self, one that graduates from
theoretical enquiry to the realm of practical interpersonal social interaction, can be grasped at the
level of inter-subjective discourse, for Russell is adamant that the objects of philosophical
reflection can never be reduced to philosophical subjectivism (solipsism) or expressed in terms
of objective, universal truth. Russell seeks to demonstrate that ethical discourse on the social
level plays out in the manner of charitable philosophical interrogation, which attempts to address
the various quandaries it encounters with a heightened sense of respect, and such a context for
ethical interaction would perhaps manifest through a loving, intractable, and ever-evolving social
discourse in which radical differences are not only recognized, but further, are privileged and
preserved above similarity and identity. Importantly, Russell intimates the responsibility that I
have for each and every living being who is quite literally not like me, radically Other in their
existence. In this realm of authentic social discourse, the philosopher (Self) also assumes the role
of the Other (not-Self) within a context where others retain their privileged status as unique,
different, and indefinable human beings, and it is in this radical notion of the not-Self
(Otherness) that Russell locates the center of human dignity. In the immediacy of our ethical
encounters with the other, we are struck and overwhelmed by our innate responsibility to be as
ethical, engulfed by the transcendent sense of wonder that allows for the manifestation of
“familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.”
According to Russell, philosophy should not to be studied because it procures definitive
answers to its questions. Rather, he suggests that philosophy should be pursued and practiced for
the way it enriches our intellect, soul, and contributes to the understanding of human potential,
which always includes the pressing and immediate concern with authentic ethical relationships.
However, it must be stressed that Russell is not propounding a rigid and complete ethical schema

or system for moral behavior, with prescribed and proscribed rights and duties. Rather, he is
working to break open the space, or context, within which the potential exists for revealing and
nurturing authentic ethical encounters in the first instance, the rich soil from which ethics can
take root, growing and flourishing in time with the proper attention. This represents Russell’s
original and primordial thinking on ethics, perhaps in terms of offering the grounds for a possible
ethics to emerge from the context established by the ethical model of philosophical enquiry,
which is highlighted by the relationship, or union, between the Self and not-Self, between the
philosopher and the objects of philosophical contemplation.
Nielsen (1990) has argued persuasively for an ethics without God, addressing the
problems of skepticism, relativism, and nihilism as they emerge from Sartre’s existentialism, by
looking to the aspects of our lives that are not merely instrumental to the achievement of further
goods, but those things which are good intrinsically, “relatively permanent sources of
happiness,” such as friendship, love, meaningful employment, security, the pursuit of ethical and
aesthetic endeavors (p. 118). Admitting that morality can never be an exact science, Nielsen
states that it is possible to establish the grounds for a humanist ethics within universal and agreed
upon sources of value, beginning with the basic “assumption that happiness and self-awareness
are fundamentally good and that pain and suffering are never desirable in themselves” (p. 119).
Without divine explanations and assurances that our world is indeed meaningful and value-laden,
Nielsen identifies many ways in which our lives take on meaning by examining the many
overlapping and interrelated explanations and purposes that are distinctly human in origin,
universally human. We do not require religion in order to understand the world as a meaningful
place of dwelling: “The goals we set for ourselves,” as Nielsen points out, “are enough to give
meaning to our lives” (p. 119).
Russell would not disagree with the ethical philosophy of Nielsen as outlined. However,
there is an important aspect of Russell’s philosophy to which I have alluded that requires an
explication, for it is often overlooked within the realm of moral speculation on the whole,
namely, the legitimate concern for “difference,” the various aspects of our unique situations that
make us radically unique, and even strange and frightening, that lies at the heart of our moral
endeavors. Nielsen’s secular ethics depend on inter-subjective agreement, on the universalization
of human commonalities stemming from rational, emotional, psychological, and physiological
sources, based on the assumption that common, if not identical, wants, needs, and desires are
shared by all humans, whether secular or God-fearing Christians. And while this is an obvious,
and to a great extent, logical starting point for humanist ethics, both Russell and Levinas, each in
his own novel way, show there is concern for a problem inherent in such thinking that attempts
to ground ethics exclusively the notion of universal similarity. It is argued, that within such a
view to ethics there is the imminent danger that the important distinction between “the same”
(The Self) and “the other” (the Not-Self) will be lost or obliterated; privilege and exclusion
emerge as inevitable side-effects when the totalization of “the same” occurs at the exclusion of
“the other.”
This is precisely the problem with traditional morality that Levinas (Totality and Infinity)
addresses when arguing for the necessity of an understanding of a more authentic and primordial
notion of ethics as existing prior to metaphysical or ontological knowledge. According to

Levinas, traditional ethics as I have described, establishing moral principles based on our
Common Human Nature, resembles idealist metaphysical speculation in that it adopts the
methodology of traditional ontology, or the study of Being qua Being, striving for systematic
knowledge of the human and its world, albeit in “ethical” terms, in which all differences are
resolved within or excluded from the totality of the system. For Levinas, and this can also be said
of Russell, it is the Other, as the locus of radical difference, who can never be assimilated by me
in knowledge, that first demands my legitimate ethical response, establishing the origins and
gesturing toward the potential parameters of ethics. As Levinas writes, “The strangeness of the
Other, his irreducibility to the ‘I,’ to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished
as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics” (p. 43).
It is possible to view Russell as resembling a kindred philosophical spirit to Levinas,
because Russell also discusses an ethical relationship that is importantly characterized by the
human’s (the Self) encounter with the radically Other nature of the not-Self. In a similar fashion,
Russell appears to oppose the notions of identity or similarity forming the singular fundamental
ground, or bedrock, for establishing morality based on what we all share universally, he suggests
that the potential for ethics must also be considered from the notion of difference, or the radical
and transcendent nature of the Other’s being. There is a unique particularity bound up with the
problem of ethics that Russell refuses to ignore, and the contemporary global landscape is such
that the obvious and apparent differences between cultures cannot be ignored. Technology, in
one respect, has brought the world’s population into closer proximity than in any other historical
age. Ironically, and herein lies the tragic double-bind at the root of humanity’s struggles, despite
the nearness of the proximity, there exists a profound ethical distance between human beings,
which appears to be insurmountable, and so I return to the question that began the essay: What is
the value of philosophy for the world and its inhabitants?
Russell (1969) has provided a powerfully viable response to this query, and in these hard
times, I believe that we would benefit by taking seriously what Russell has to say about the
practice of philosophical enquiry. Ultimately, the only hope for authentic social justice is through
united group activity - and if Russell is correct, philosophy holds the potential to inspire such
practical ethical activity, with the potential to make us true cosmopolitans in this rapidly
expanding epoch of globalization, “citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war
with all the rest” (p. 161).
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